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Affinity Studies and Open Systems:  
A Non-equilibrium, Ecocritical Reading of Goethe's Faust  
Heather I. Sullivan 
 
Ecocriticism's contributions to the current rejection of 
dualistic thinking are noteworthy, particularly when this 
interdisciplinary field concentrates on hybridity and "relations" 
that pre-exist essences. In this mode, ecocriticism participates 
in a broader development of "affinity studies" that encompass the 
many efforts across the disciplines towards reconfiguring our 
"intra-actions" with the world in terms that avoid dichotomies 
and Newtonian linearity and that utilize instead non-linear, non-
dualistic forms of "hybridity." Hybrids, in Steve Hinchliffe's 
words in Geographies of Nature, are "more or less durable bodies 
made up of similarly hybrid and impermanent relations. Things 
are, to use another commonly used term, configured, or drawn 
together, in order to become more or less stable forms. There are 
no pre-existing essences, only relations."1 In affinity studies, 
in other words, human agency emerges as a complex entanglement of 
cultural and physical pulses, or as distributed and part of flows 
between "open systems." Nature and culture and other such 
divisions are replaced by hybrid forms with permeable boundaries. 
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It is in light of affinity studies that I read Goethe's Faust, 
which may seem contradictory since the play is most frequently 
understood exactly as that against which I wish to argue here: as 
the ultimate vision of an individualistic (male, "European," 
"rational") mastermind who stands alone to alter and seek control 
over the world. In this essay, however, I explore how the play 
itself actually undermines such standard interpretations with its 
triple-frames that contextualize Faust's choices within larger, 
cosmic, poetic, or theatrical situations, but also with the focus 
on Mephistophelean influence, and finally on the play's (fluid) 
structure provided by the water imagery and flows. This is 
therefore a reinterpretation of Faust as a play questioning 
rather than exemplifying human control over nature/world; it is a 
study of unleashed affinities hybridizing individual 
determination.  
Ecocriticism presents a wide range of ideas relevant for 
affinity studies. Many ecocritics build on Merleau Ponty's 
dialogics, such as Patrick Murphy's ground-breaking descriptions 
of a dialogical process of "inter-animating relationships."2 A 
similar strategy can be found in the tendency to emphasize 
"multiplicities" rather than individual subjects. Eric Todd 
Smith, for example, provides a paradigmatic shift away from the 
"subject" as grandiose "agent." He notes with significant 
relevance for Faust studies: "Perhaps, then, subjectivity should 
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not be the goal. I suggest we drop the subject of the subject, 
and that of its defining opposite, the object, as the grand poles 
staking out existence. Let us think, rather, about multiple 
mediations and relationships, not marked out by membership in one 
of the two great camps of subject and object, but rather by 
specific embodiments, situations, and affinities."3 Dana 
Phillips' volume, The Truth of Ecology: Nature, Culture, and 
Literature in America, demonstrates how ecocriticism shares 
significant affinities with postmodern theory, and it also 
suggests a focus on hybrids: "I am persuaded that the truth of 
ecology must lie somewhere, if it lies anywhere at all, in 
nature-culture, a region where surprising monsters dwell. In 
order to adapt itself to the vagaries of nature-culture, 
ecocriticism needs to be more willing to hybridize than it has 
been: it needs to have a heart and a brain as well as arms and 
legs, and as many of each as possible, and it should not hesitate 
to borrow additional body parts here and there as the need 
arises."4 Phillips' nature-culture with its hybrid body-parts 
exemplifies an affinity-studies emphasis on the fluidity of 
boundaries, or the openness of systems, even as it notes the 
monsters that can emerge from a view not dependent on traditional 
delineations of individual agency. Goethe's Faust, too, portrays 
a rather monstrous, albeit highly celebrated, figure whose 
engagement with Mephistopheles is--I am definitely reading 
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against the grain here--one of affinity not ultimate 
individuality. Despite the positive nuances of the term 
"affinity," it is, in fact, as much about association and 
alliance, or being "drawn towards" something, as it is a 
repulsion and monstrous breakdown of boundaries flowing into 
hybridity. 
In order to move into affinity studies via ecocriticism and 
Faust, I explore here an "open-systems" model for ecocriticism 
that builds on the concepts of "distributed agency" as being on a 
continuum or open flow of inorganic matter, organisms, 
ecosystems, and cultural exchanges. In this system there is no 
absolute separation between environment and organism; rather, 
every environment makes and is made by the organisms and flows 
composing it. This model for ecocriticism relates to the images 
described in Ilya Prigogine's open-system, nonequilibrium 
thermodynamics, and its shape is a spiraling flow of irreversible 
time: the image of a galaxy, a hurricane seen from satellite 
images, a tornado, a snail's twisting shell, or--one can hardly 
resist noting in light of the environmental debates of the 
twenty-first century--the water rushing down a flushing toilet.  
Prigogine's "new dialogue with nature" emphasizes the solar-
energy driven flows among "open systems" (open boundaries 
exchanging energy, materials, information) including living 
beings, cultural structures, and ecologies.5 It also suggests 
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what Peter Taylor terms "distributed agency" rather than a 
singular, monolithic causality. Distributed agency emerges within 
the interpersonal, cultural, and natural flows around it; that 
is, it is also "open" to other flows and influenced by affinities 
within them. An open-systems, distributed agency model for 
affinity studies is thus much like descriptions of ecological 
systems where the human-nature interface consists of multiple 
systems of interacting, yet not necessarily harmonious, flows. An 
awareness of these systems would require, in Val Plumwoods words, 
overcoming our "illusory sense of autonomy" and "such monological 
and hegemonic forms of reason" that "misunderstand their own 
enabling conditions--the body, ecology and non-human nature."6  
An affinity-studies model based on open-systems and 
distributed agency recognizes, indeed, the body, ecology, and 
non-human nature as "enabling conditions." Unlike Niklas Luhmann 
whose systems theory proposes a change from the "unity of the 
social whole as a smaller unity within a larger one (the world) 
to the difference of the system of society and environment," an 
open-systems model posits neither "unity" nor "difference" as its 
"theoretical point of departure."7 Instead, it insists on 
hybridity, relations instead of essences, and the affinities of 
open systems. Luhmann's discussion relies upon the tension 
between open and closed systems: "The dynamics of complex 
autopoietic systems itself forms a recursively closed complex of 
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operations, i.e., one that is geared toward self-reproduction and 
the continuation of its own autopoiesis. At the same time, the 
system becomes increasingly open, i.e., sensible to changing 
environmental conditions."8 His emphasis is on the internal 
communication of social systems that perceive themselves as 
closed. In contrast, I suggest a model with greater emphasis on 
what we so often ignore: the porous boundaries and affinities of 
our bodies, minds, and cultures integrated with their 
environments in all forms. Robert E. Ulanowicz, in fact, 
describes organisms themselves as "super ecosystems," and notes, 
"In sum, the world is open, not deterministic or rigidly 
coupled."9 Similarly, Richard C. Lewontin states: "Organisms, 
then, both make and are made by their environment."10 It is not a 
unique characteristic of human beings to construct their world, 
but nor should we ignore the fact that we are also constructed by 
it. This "being constructed" includes the physical environment 
and our development within that environment as well as cultural 
systems. Lewontin's comments indicate an organism-environment 
continuum of sorts, one of affinities within open systems of 
exchange, reciprocal shaping, and distributed agency. 
I explore Faust in terms of open systems and affinities, 
noting that the play portrays a "demigod" agent most often 
described as the "Übermensch," whose power, derives, however, 
rather problematically from Mephistopheles and the witch's brew. 
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Faust's endless striving raises the specter of troubled activism-
-do we emulate his technological "progress" seemingly condoned by 
his final ascension with the angels, or do we condemn his 
destructive efforts at "flow-control" with the damming of the 
sea?11 Faust believes himself to be self-determining, but a look 
at the pestilent swamps resulting from his dam and his fall into 
death in contrast to the final leaps of the test-tube Homunculus, 
and Faust's and Helena's mythical son, Euphorion, shows us the 
complexity of action and agency in the play. Whereas the 
"creations" Homunculus and Euphorion are lured by seductive 
voices to fling themselves (actively) into the water and off the 
cliffs, Faust falls dead (passively) into the grave he thought 
was a channel to drain the pestilent swamps left from damming the 
sea. Indeed, he is inert--dead--when Mephistopheles and the 
angels engage in an erotic battle over his remains. If his final 
act and moment of death are significant, then the common view of 
Faust as primarily a rational and active force appears misled; a 
more accurate reading notes that the impulses driving Faust and 
the impulses he creates emerge from a distributed agency, much 
like the affinities of attraction (and repulsion) in Goethe's 
1809 novel Elective Affinities which engage the figures with 
drives beyond their individual consciousness. If Faust is, as so 
often is claimed, the "modern man," then it is only as one 
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suffering under the illusion of being a "self-determining agent" 
blind to his affinities and "enabling conditions."   
One strategy for contextualizing Faust's affinities and 
enabling conditions is to look at the play's fluid structure, its 
typically Goethean insistence on nature and world as constantly 
in motion and in process ("Werden") or metamorphosis. This we 
find in Faust presented symbolically by the earth spirit and 
quite concretely by the extensive water imagery in the play. Most 
scholars note how the play is inundated with references to 
Goethe's scientific idea of polarity and "Steigerung" (upwards 
movement, increase); but images of water flow as nature's motion 
incarnate are equally present in the play. For example, Faust 
first claims to have an affinity to the earth spirit with its 
"tides of living, in doing's storm, / Up, down, I wave, / Waft to 
and fro,"12 but because the earth spirit scorns him, he then 
claims not just affinity but in fact shared being with the 
"waterfall" about to destroy the "little hut" that is Gretchen. 
He is, he notes: "the homeless rover, / The man-beast void of 
goal or bliss, / Who roars in cataracts from cliff to boulder / 
in Avid frenzy for the precipice."13  
While life in Goethe's view is motion, Faust as waterfall 
presents a violent force whose affinities smash endlessly 
downwards; his self-portrait as a waterfall neglects the larger 
cycle of precipitation and evaporation typical of Goethe's 
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science. (Although one could postulate that his final ascension 
actually does, in fact, enact the rise of water in evaporation.) 
Faust's limited self-description as a waterfall in Part I is, 
however, also highly relevant for Part II where there are 
defining water images in each act, beginning in Act 1 with 
Faust's celebrated rainbow reflected in the crashing waterfall--
whose power and aesthetics he now savors rather than regrets--and 
ending in Act V with his dam. He progresses from seeking to be 
like the multidirectional "tides of living" to being a 
unidirectional "waterfall," and finally to damming the water's 
tides and flows. This shift in forms of agency has clear 
consequences, since Faust's quest to stop the flow also concludes 
with his death. His dam thus becomes the metaphor for the 
Faustian consciousness that blindly sees its own agency but not 
its inevitable affinities and "enabling conditions," and thus 
believes that it can close the open systems of flow.  
The model of open-systems--as part of affinity studies--
comes from the science of "nonequilibrium, open-system 
thermodynamics," a field that studies the complex systems like 
hurricanes, tornadoes, chemical reactions, life forms, and 
ecosystems that emerge as "dissipative structures" from the 
continuous influx of solar energy. Their boundaries are not 
impermeable and not at equilibrium. Prigogine, the 1977 Nobel 
Laureate in chemistry for his work on nonequilibrium processes, 
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writes: "Over the past several decades, a new science has been 
born, the physics of nonequilibrium processes, and has led to 
concepts such as self-organization and dissipative structures, 
which are widely used today in a large spectrum of disciplines, 
including cosmology, chemistry, and biology, as well as ecology 
and the social sciences."14 Open-system thermodynamics are a 
recent corrective to the closed systems of traditional 
thermodynamics that reduce the study of energy patterns into a 
controllable, contained structure (the world as a one-liter box 
filled with gas--or, if you will, the delusion of Faustian 
control and closure), whose dynamics eventually reach equilibrium 
and maximum disorder.15 Eric D. Schneider and Dorion Sagan 
summarize Prigogine's nonequilibrium, open-system thermodynamics 
as follows: 
"It studies how energy flow works to bring about complex 
structures, structures that cycle the fluids, gases, and 
liquids of which they're made, structures that have a 
tendency to change and grow. Since you may recognize such 
structures--you are one of them!--as including life, the 
science in question can be described as the thermodynamics 
of life. But actually the science encompasses more than 
life. It extends to virtually all naturally occurring 
complex structures, from whirlpools to construction workers. 
Because the flow systems that seem sometimes to be self-
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organized or even miraculous are in fact organized by the 
flows around them, to which they are open and connected, 
another name for this science is open system thermodynamics. 
Technically, open system thermodynamics has been known most 
often by the imposing name of ‘nonequilibrium 
thermodynamics'--because the systems of interest, the 
centers of flow, growth, and change, are not static, still 
or dead; they are not in equilibrium."16 
The patterns of complexity--such as spiraling hurricanes, all 
life forms (organisms), ecosystems, and, Schneider and Sagan 
suggest, economic interactions including the flow between city 
and farm--emerge out of a gradient of difference (in temperature, 
pressure, chemistry, or quantity of resources, which move like 
heated molecules dissipating into the cool). As the gradient 
drives the rush of energy or materials, the system often leaps 
into new shapes of flow that more readily expend energy (thus 
following the second law of thermodynamics by increasing entropy) 
but thereby also increase complexity and even "self-organize"--
express affinities--in perpetuating specific flows.  
The mechanism for the emergence of the "dissipative 
structures," as Prigogine calls them, is simply the fluctuations 
in the flow. These inevitable fluctuations, whether very slight 
or large, can produce nondeterministic bifurcations (the 
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unpredictable "leaps" into new orders of flow).17 In the Forward 
to Prigogine's Order out of Chaos, Alvin Toffler notes that:  
"In Prigoginian terms, all systems contain subsystems which 
are continually "fluctuating." At times, a single 
fluctuation or a combination of them may become so powerful, 
as a result of positive feedback, that it shatters the 
preexisting organization. At this revolutionary moment--the 
authors call it a "singular moment" or a "bifurcation 
point"--it is inherently impossible to determine in advance 
which direction change will take: whether the system will 
disintegrate into "chaos" or leap to a new, more 
differentiated, higher level of "order" or organization, 
which they call a "dissipative structure."18  
The bifurcation, then, is the moment whose outcome cannot be 
predicted, and it is the leap into possible complexity which 
Prigogine terms "creativity" in nature such as the spiraling 
shapes of fractals images and weather systems. The systems emerge 
at the bifurcation and then, with continued gradient-driven 
flows, fluctuations, and positive feedback, can achieve another 
bifurcation and again leap into ever more powerful or complex 
systems. Many scientists working in nonequilibrium thermodynamics 
see these leaps as the possible origins of life and of the mind's 
structure.  
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Recognizing this dynamic complexity based on flowing 
interactions among various open systems driven by gradients of 
difference and receiving flux from multiple directions (as Sagan 
and Schneider say: "organized by the flows around them"), 
provides a perspective that studies the patterns and affinities 
of the human-nature interface. Prigogine summarizes the potential 
of this perspective: "We are observing the birth of a new 
scientific era. We are observing the birth of a science that is 
no longer limited to idealized and simplified situations but 
reflects the complexity of the real world, a science that views 
us and our creativity as part of a fundamental trend present at 
all levels of nature."19 An open-systems model thus begins with 
the assumption that the human-nature interface is part of a 
continuum of complex, interrelated patterns rather than a 
question of (absolute) difference. It also suggests, however, 
that human culture emerges with its own distinctive patterns of 
creativity that both echo those of nature and that leap into 
other directions at the nondeterministic bifurcations--in 
Prigogine's words, the "intrinsic differentiation between 
different parts of the system."20 Humanity's "intrinsic 
differentiation" and creativity take many forms, including the 
Faustian quest to conquer history, myth, and nature in order to 
"grasp" and control its enabling conditions. 
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Seeing the intrinsic differentiation via open systems whose 
enabling conditions cannot be controlled(Stuart Kauffman 
describes it biologically: "we cannot finitely prestate the 
configuration space of a biosphere")21 should not, however, imply 
a grand-systems model disallowing cultural differences with 
another form of monolithic, "phallo-logocentric," imperialistic, 
and rationalist Western thinking that perceives the world (and 
all its diverse cultures) in singular, universal, and 
hierarchical terms. Prigogine comments on the diversity of 
natural structures with terms he also applies to human cultures: 
"Our universe has a pluralistic, complex character."22 The 
complex yet open aspects of the human/nature interface described 
by Prigogine are destabilizing, but it does not necessarily 
follow that there is no hope of altering systems. The overt 
Faustian lesson that we know all too well is, of course, that we 
can alter our world; the more subtle and significant lesson is 
that our alterations are part of multiple forces including nature 
and culture that alter us continually and that take on 
impressively diverse forms. As Kauffman puts it: "So organisms, 
niches, and search procedures jointly and self-consistently co-
construct one another!"23 There is, in other words, no dualism of 
"simple matter" versus "complex culture"; both nature and culture 
are complex and diverse, and both function within "co-
constructing" exchanges. Prigogine provides here an exemplary 
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type of affinity-studies thinking. Ira Livingston considers this 
turn towards relationality to be part of the economic development 
that moves from gold to paper money (this is a major theme in 
Faust II) and then to "horizontally interaffiliated and 
outsourced networks" which occurs as "Newton's once comfortingly 
hard and indivisible atoms, having already been shattered into 
bits and the bits into dancing probabilistic clouds, are further 
dematerialized into virtual 'spin networks' of pure 
relationality."24 Agency takes on a new "spin" here in terms of 
affinity studies. 
This is not the demise of individual agency, however. 
According to Prigogine, such a view still includes the 
unpredictable and powerful possibilities of the smallest 
participants or fluctuations to produce massive alterations: 
"We know now that societies are immensely complex systems 
involving a potentially enormous number of bifurcations 
exemplified by the variety of cultures that have evolved in 
the relatively short span of human history. We know that 
such systems are highly sensitive to fluctuations. This 
leads both to hope and a threat: hope, since even small 
fluctuations may grow and change the overall structure. As a 
result, individual activity is not doomed to insignificance. 
On the other hand, this is also a threat, since in our 
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universe the security of stable, permanent rules seems gone 
forever."25  
In Faust, the hubris of individualistic agency explodes on 
stage with "small fluctuations" leaving massive wakes, even as it 
is simultaneously undermined by the many other affinities within 
the play. Goethe's play, in fact, provides an early form of 
"affinities"; one based on a precarious balance between polarized 
forces. Faust and Mephistopheles culminate their 
"accomplishments" with illusions of flooding and then with 
efforts to dam the sea as if the world were merely the backdrop 
for their whims.  One must contrast these bold acts with Goethe's 
frequently stated views and practices contextualizing our choices 
within "nature" and cultural trends. Goethe is famous for seeing 
human behavior in terms of patterns similar to those in nature. 
Recent recognition of this fact has led to extensive discussion 
of his works, particularly Faust, in terms of complexity and 
chaos theory.26 Additionally, Goethe (in-)famously writes his 
literary texts as "open systems" of intertextuality woven from so 
many references and citations to other texts that much of the 
scholarship on Goethe simply clarifies the sources. The 
intertextuality of Faust is, one could say, itself a form of 
"distributed agency," with its typically Goethean composite of 
many texts, traditions, historical eras, and cultures that shape 
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it and that are, in turn, shaped by Goethe's writing. Goethe 
himself called it a "collective effort."  
Goethe scholars, in fact, readily assess parts of the play 
(which was composed over 60 years of Goethe's life) as being a 
"product" of his "Storm and Stress" period, or of the 
Enlightenment, or of his scientific works, his reaction to the 
French revolution and the failed 1830 revolution, etc. Yet they 
are slower to see Faust the figure as a "product" of many forces 
instead of a Producer; they thereby perpetuate the Faustian myth 
of controlling agency. Faust's own delusions regarding his self-
determined agency contrast similarly with the text's larger 
refusal to be isolated from its "enabling conditions." As John 
McCarthy notes, collective efforts (or distributed agency) can 
take on astonishing new forms through (Goethean) creativity.27 
Turning to the question of agency, I ask in terms of 
affinity studies: is Faust the powerfully active agent of modern 
subjectivity, or the hubristically individualistic man 
intoxicated by witch's brew and "drawn onwards" by multiple 
forces? Much of the scholarship answers with a clear emphasis on 
Faust's dominant agency, leading primarily to debates about 
whether it's a positive or negative force. Martin Swales, for 
example, describes Faust as the "modern man," leading a "way of 
life and form of subjectivity that is consistently expressive of 
modern culture."28 For Swales, Faust is "an intense 
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individualist, he believes in the authority of his own 
experience, his own judgments, and is not beholden to received 
wisdom, to dogma, to shared institutional assumptions."29 Géza 
von Molnár, similarly, claims that Faust "comes to see himself as 
a free agent among other free agents on free soil, that is to say 
on territory wrested from the control of nature and made into a 
free sphere of human intercourse." 30 Others, like R.H. Stephenson 
and Benjamin Bennett, turn away from the more grandiose vision of 
Faust, highlighting instead a dialectical view derived from 
Faust's claim that "Two souls, alas, are dwelling in my 
breast."31 For Stephenson, this is a productive tension based on 
Goethe's science of polarity; for Bennett, it's the alienation of 
self-consciousness from the world.32  
There are also notable analyses among those who directly 
criticize Faust's agency. For example, James van der Laan sees 
humanity's hubristic belief that we "agents" are in complete 
control via technology as likely leading to a world that is 
itself controlled by technology.33 For Jochen Schmidt, Faust's 
grand error is to believe in the illusion of progress (ironically 
suggested by the final ascension) that is undermined with the 
play's final rejection of the "realm beyond" ("jenseits"), 
leaving only the senseless and destructive effects here in this 
realm.34 Kate Rigby rightly brings Goethe himself into the 
equation as one who may decry the horrible burning deaths of 
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Philemon and Baucis but also one who celebrates "man's gain of 
habitable land." Rigby's Goethe is "after all, the inheritor of a 
tradition from which he never entirely freed himself, whereby the 
appropriation and domination of the earth by humanity was in some 
sense preordained."35 Jost Hermand, in contrast, defends Goethe 
by contrasting his "green world-piousness" with Faust's "false 
consciousness" gone berserk with a "narcissistic and ego-maniacal 
drive towards destruction."36 Indeed, Hermand criticizes the 
critics for their tendency to equate Goethe with Faust and to see 
them both as primarily positive, self-assertive agents. Hermand's 
de-emphasis of striving agency with a turn to Goethe's science is 
fruitful, yet so is Rigby's concern that Goethe himself 
postulates a Promethean human agency that sees the world as 
material to be made into our own image. Combining these two 
views, the open-systems model of affinities reads Faust as a 
participant in systems that make and are made by their 
environments. 
Goethe himself describes human agency as a "weave": "The 
weave of our lives and influences is made of various different 
threads, in that the necessary, the random, the involuntary and 
the purely desired--each with the most different form and each 
not often able to be differentiated--delimit each other."37 
Indeed, an emphasis on the weave in Faust--rather than 
individualistic agency--helps explains the tiny scene in Part I: 
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"Night, Open Field." As Faust and Mephistopheles rush to rescue 
Gretchen from prison and execution, they pass by mysterious 
figures in the dark. Faust asks "What are they weaving (weben) 
there around the raven-stone?"38 It is Faust who poses the 
question about weaving, whereas Mephistopheles tries to deny any 
knowledge of the figures by claiming they're witches and shouting 
"Away, Away!"39 Mephistopheles avoids answering the question 
about these weaving women who appear like fates, for he is 
teaching Faust the illusion of self-directed agency. For Jane 
Brown, Mephistopheles teaches illusion because Faust, she claims, 
is about "the difficulty of knowing, about the ineffability of 
truth."40 The illusion here, however, is more specific; it is the 
illusion of controlling the flow and determining both one's own 
fate and that of others. Gretchen's final moment damages Faust's 
illusion of power because she both refuses to escape with him and 
she is "rescued" by a cosmic force, or by the Lord as the "voice 
from above." Faust portrays the illusions of those in the weave 
who see only their own unidirectional impetus. 
Goethe is not coy with his idea that the weaving "flow" is 
significant. Faust's conjuring begins with the earth spirit which 
describes itself as: "An endless flow / A changeful plaiting, / 
Fiery begetting, / Thus at Time's scurrying loom I weave and warp 
/ And broider at the Godhead's living garb."41 The earth spirit 
weaves, the "fates" weave, and even Mephistopheles tries to weave 
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with illusions; this is Faust's realm where the many flows 
interact with the ripples of his own influence. Formulating such 
a "weave" is Taylor's theory of "distributed agency," which 
states that we need:  
"metaphors and concepts that do not rely on the dynamic 
unity and coherency of agents. And to the extent that such 
patterns of thought persist because of their resonance with 
actions in the material and social world, we need different 
experiences. Or, better, we need to highlight submerged 
experience of ourselves as 'object-like' or 'distributed,' 
that is, as agents dependent on other people and many, 
diverse resources beyond the boundaries of our physical and 
mental selves. After all, the primary experience of becoming 
an autonomous subject is not 'raw' experience, let alone 
uniform and universal experience . . . but experience 
mediated through particular social discourse."42 
Distributed agency--a typical concept in affinity studies--
implies that our "human environment" is composed of, and 
influenced by, other human beings, and "diverse resources beyond 
the boundaries of our physical and mental selves."43 For Taylor, 
this de-emphasis of individual self-determination allows for 
individual agency, but one that is influenced by, and produces 
effects through, "intersecting processes" of different agents.44 
Faust, the play, enacts "distributed agency" in its overall 
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"weave" but also with the weighty implications of its frame of 
three prefatory texts ("Dedication," "Prelude in the Theater" and 
"Prologue in Heaven") which provide multiple inconsonant 
impulses--or, perhaps, inescapable influences on the figures and 
action--coming from the poet, the director, the merry person, as 
well as from the Job-like gamble made between the Lord and 
Mephistopheles (which provides a relevant context for Faust's own 
gamble). This excessive framing serves to accentuate the plethora 
of perspectives and influences on the action, and also the fact 
that this is a play where Faust is a fluid point in a matrix 
rather than the central will. He acts within multiple larger (and 
open) frameworks: that is, his movements are "organized by the 
flows around them."45  
In contrast to the play itself, Faust, the figure, desires 
to "grasp" these flows, perceiving nature as "breasts" whose flow 
he longs to drink: "How, boundless Nature, seize you in my clasp? 
/ You breasts where, all life's sources twain /. . . You brim, 
you quench, yet I must thirst in vain?"46 Failing to emulate the 
earth spirit and unable to grasp "nature's breasts," Faust 
instead drinks the witch's brew, seduces and impregnates 
Gretchen, and then dances with witches, all the while thinking of 
himself as a destructive "waterfall" in Part I. The immediate 
link to Part II occurs when Faust wakes up in the "charming 
landscape" of Act 1, the site where he observes a waterfall and 
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the resulting rainbow: "So, sun in back, my eye too weak to scan 
it, / I rather follow, with entrancement growing, / The cataract 
that cleaves the jagged granite, / From fall to fall, in thousand 
leaps, outthrowing / A score of thousand streams in its 
revolving."47 The rainbow's significance has been thoroughly 
debated, yet it is the "waterfall" with its crashing streams that 
are Faust's motif in the next four acts. In fact, after Faust 
goes in Act 1 "down" to the mysterious "mothers," Acts II-V all 
deploy influential female water spirits or nymphs. Thus at the 
end of Act II, the sirens lure Homunculus to make his final leap 
into the ocean. They sing: "Buxom Nereids, come near, / Pleasing-
wild unto the sight, / Bring, sweet Dorids, Galatea, / Her high 
mother's image quite."48 Once he's leaped, their chorus 
celebrates with such passion that the entire cosmos joins the 
song. Act III, then, depicts Helena, Faust, and Euphorion, but 
the frame is Helena's chorus of women. They first convince Helena 
to join Faust, and then decide at the end of the act to stay in 
the realm above and become water nymphs rather than return with 
her to the underworld. These nymphs proclaim the various powers 
they shall hold via: growing fruits, water's crashing thunder, 
water cycling through the land, the trees, and the air, and, 
finally, the grapes that become Dionysian wines. They are water 
as agency. In Act IV, in fact, it is the water spirits who help 
Mephistopheles create the illusion of a flood that defeats the 
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enemy emperor's soldiers. This flood is another "waterfall," one 
sent by the "Undines" of the Great Mountain Lake. Mephistopheles 
notes that this is an illusion, albeit one whose power amuses 
him: "I can see nothing of these watery lies, / The spell 
bewilders only human eyes, / I am amused by the bizarre 
affair".49 From the desire for control to the illusion of 
control: that is the Faustian trajectory. 
It is also Act IV where Faust declares his desire to harness 
the water's power by damming the ocean, since he is annoyed by 
its lack of "purpose": "On the high sea my eye was lately 
dwelling, / It surged, in towers self upon self upwelling. / Then 
it subsided and poured forth its breakers / To storm the 
mainland's broad and shallow acres. . . ./ There wave on wave 
imbued with power has heaved, / But to withdraw--and nothing is 
achieved; / Which drives me near to desperate distress! / Such 
elemental might unharnessed, purposeless!"50 With the damming of 
the sea in Act V, we have the culmination of Faustian efforts. It 
is at the moment of deluded technological control over the flow 
and designation of purpose, as Faust exalts in rapture over the 
future land and "free people" who might occupy this place wrested 
from the water's incessant tides (and funded by exploitative 
colonial conquering), when he collapses into death. The dam 
itself appears real, not an illusion as was the military 
waterfall; the illusion here is that Faust can completely control 
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the water. Mephistopheles says in an aside: "For us alone you are 
at pains / With all your dikes and moles; a revel / For Neptune, 
the old water-devil, / Is all you spread, if you but knew. / You 
lose, whatever your reliance-- / The elements are sworn to our 
alliance, / In ruin issues all you do."51  
Even Mephistopheles' final glee over Faust's defeat, 
however, is misled, as he himself is distracted in the end by the 
burning roses and angelic backsides. The dam represents the 
grandiose belief in agency that holds back the sea, at least for 
the moment. Faust is the "waterfall" smashing others even while 
being pummeled by the tumultuous flows and illusions. Faust is 
part of the flows, part of the distributed agency, and part of 
the open systems of affinity. 
Using Goethe for an ecocritical exploration of open-systems 
as part of affinity studies is an obvious choice because he 
famously describes the world in terms of flowing polarity and the 
tension between our control and the "elective affinities" which 
bind and repulse us. Also, Goethe's works inspired some of the 
pioneers in chaos and systems theory including Prigogine, James 
Gleick and Mitchell Feigenbaum.52 As part of affinity studies, an 
ecocritical model of open systems looks at flows, boundaries, and 
agency; it asks how the human/nature interface is portrayed in 
terms of open or closed boundaries and/or in terms of individual, 
cultural, or open and distributed agency. Faust reveals how 
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powerful the illusion of unidirectional control is--it 
reinforces, in fact, the control we and all organisms have in 
"environment-making." But it also suggests--despite what Faust 
himself believes and despite what much of the critical 
scholarship asserts--that environments or cosmic forces, if you 
will, simultaneously make us in multidirectional flows.  
Goethe's Faust begins with a bargain between the Lord and 
Mephistopheles, a framing strategy that overtly insists that 
forces are at work driving Faust far more than he realizes, and 
the play ends with Faust being drawn passively and inertly as 
voices sing a request to the "Holy Virgin, Mother, Queen, / 
Goddess, pour Thy mercies."53 Somewhere in-between the Lord's 
pact and the eternal feminine's act of drawing him onwards, we 
find Faust with his "agency" as the possibility of 
nondeterministic fluctuation, his Mephistophelean gifts, and his 
acceptance of unidirectional illusions. It is in this in-between 
that affinity studies place us, as agents individually and yet 
also as part of distributed agency, as enacting "relations" 
rather than essences. Goethe similarly focuses on motion and 
multi-figure engagement in his literature and science. It should 
not surprise us, then, that the final statement in Faust begins 
with the famously ambiguous declaration, "Alles Vergängliche / 
Ist nur ein Gleichnis,"54 which has been translated as "All that 
is changeable / Is but reflected."55 I suggest in contrast that 
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we read it with affinities in mind, thus as "All that is 
transitory / Is but a relation ("Gleichnis" can mean a brief 
pictorial tale exemplifying an abstract idea by relating it 
through a concrete story; it is an analogy, a matter of relating 
one thing or idea to another). In other words, Faust shares with 
affinity studies an urgent desire to flee "essences" and 
individuality as if they were solidly "closed," and to move 
instead towards perspectives of relationality. Beautiful though 
relationality may sound in this context, it also presents 
dangerous tendencies. Affinities are certainly characterized as 
similarities, relations, and attractions, but they are also 
described as resulting from being involuntarily drawn together 
(or "onwards," perhaps, as in Faust's final moment of being drawn 
onwards by the "eternal feminine": "Das Ewig-Weibliche / Zieht 
uns hinan"56). Faust, the play, successfully portrays the 
provocative in-between of hybridity as affinity even as its 
"heroic" figure becomes a caricature of monstrously devouring 
hybridity as questionably involuntary power.   
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 Prigogine writes in Order out of chaos: "We now know that far 
from equilibrium, new types of structures may originate 
spontaneously. In far-from equilibrium conditions we may have 
transformation from disorder, from thermal chaos, into order. New 
dynamic states of matter may originate, states that reflect the 
interaction of a given system with its surroundings" (12, 
emphasis mine).  
6
 Plumwood, 9 and 16-17.  
7
 Luhmann, 6-7.  
8
 Luhmann 13 
9
 Ulanowicz, 147. Ulanowicz describes here an open-systems, 
nonequilibrium study of ecology. 
10
 Lewontin, 66. 
11
 Astrida Orle Tantillo comments on Faust's final ascension in 
terms of Goethe's science in her recent article, "Damned to 
Heaven," 2007. 
12
 Goethe, Faust, 501-3. 
13
 Goethe, Faust, 3347-3351. 
14
 Prigogine, The End of Certainty, 3.  
15
 Prigogine comments: "In the classical view, the second law 
expressed the increase of molecular disorder; as expressed by 
 29 
                                                                                                                                                              
Boltzmann, thermodynamic equilibrium corresponds to the state of 
maximum 'probability.'" Prigogine, From Being to Becoming. xii. 
16
 Schneider and Sagan, xii, emphasis mine.  
17
 Prigogine and Grégoire Nicolis describe this as follows: "But 
beyond a critical value . . ., the effect of fluctuations or 
small external perturbations is no longer damped. The system acts 
like an amplifier, moves away from the reference state, and 
evolves to a new regime . . . This is the phenomenon of 
bifurcation." 72.   
18
 Toffler, xv. 
19
 Prigogine, The End of Certainty, 7. 
20
  Nicolis and Prigogine, Exploring Complexity, 74. 
21
 Kauffman, x.  
22
 Prigogine, Order out of Chaos, 9. 
23
 Kauffman, Investigations, 20. 
24
 Livingston, 153.  
25
 Prigogine, Order out of Chaos, 312-13. 
26
 See especially the discussions in McCarthy, Rowland, and van 
der Laan. 
27
 See McCarthy's Remapping Reality: Chaos and Creativity in 
Science and Literature.  
28
 Swales, 42. 
29
 Swales, 42. 
 30 
                                                                                                                                                              
30
 von Molnar, 64. 
31
 Goethe, Faust, 1112. 
32
 Bennett writes: "Faust is driven to despair, to the brink of 
nonexistence, by the dialectical operation of the inescapable 
self-consciousness that alienates us mentally from ourselves in 
every instant of existence, so that we never truly experience our 
ideal knowledge of ourselves and are never intellectually in 
command of our experience." 29. 
33
 See van der Laan, "Faust the Technological Mastermind," 12.  
34
 See especially Schmidt's chapter "Fortschritt als 
Zerstörungswerk der Moderne." 
35
 Rigby, 211. 
36
 Hermand, 48. translation mine. 
37
 Goethe, Sprüche in Prosa, 373, #6.20.1, translation mine. 
38
 In some cases, the translation is mine for reasons of clarity. 
Here, for example, the quotation is from the Frankfurt edition of 
Faust. Texte. 4399. 
39
 Goethe, Faust, 4404. 
40
 Brown, 50. 
41
 Goethe, Faust, 505-9. 
42
 Taylor, 313. emphasis mine. 
43
 Taylor, 313.  
44
 Taylor, 327. 
 31 
                                                                                                                                                              
45
 Schneider and Sagan, xii. 
46
 Goethe, Faust, 456-459. 
47
 Goethe, Faust, 4715-19. 
48
 Goethe, Faust, 8383-86. 
49
 Goethe, Faust, 10734-36. 
50
 Goethe, Faust, 10198-10219. 
51
 Goethe, Faust, 11544-50.  
52
 See especially Rowland's forward noting that Prigogine himself 
cites Goethe, p. xii; and McCarthy's discussion of Goethe's 
influence, p. 176-77. 
53
 Goethe, Faust, 12101-3. 
54
 Goethe, Faust, 12104-5. 
55
 This is taken from Arndt's translation. 
55
 Goethe, Faust, 12110-11. 
 
Bibliography 
 
Bennett, Benjamin. Goethe's Theory of Poetry: Faust and the 
Regeneration of Language. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1986. 
Brown, Jane K. Faust: Theater of the World. New York: Twayne, 
1992. 
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang. Faust: A Tragedy. Trans. Walter Arndt. 
New York: Norton, 2001. 
 32 
                                                                                                                                                              
------. Faust. Texte. In Johann Wolfgang Goethe: Sämtliche Werke, 
vol. 7.1. Frankfurt am Main: Klassiker, 1994. 
------. Sprüche in Prosa. In Johann Wolfgang Goethe. Sämtliche 
Werke, vol. 13. Frankfurt am Main: Klassiker, 1993. 
Hermand, Jost. Im Wettlauf mit der Zeit: Anstöße zu einer 
ökologiebewußten Ästhetik. (Racing with Time: Impulses for 
an Ecologically Conscious Aesthetics) Berlin: Sigma Bohn, 
1991. 
Hinchliffe, Steve. Geographies of Nature: Societies, 
Environments, Ecologies. Los Angeles: Sage, 2007. 
Kauffman, Stuart. Investigations. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 
2000. 
Lewontin, Richard C. "Gene, Organism and Environment." In Cycles 
of Contingency: Developmental Systems and Evolution, eds. 
Susan Oyama, Paul E. Griffiths, and Russell D. Gray, 59-66. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001. 
Livingston, Ira. Between Science and Literature: An Introduction 
to Autopoetics. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 2006. 
Luhmann, Niklas. Ecological Communication. Trans. John Benarz, 
Jr. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1989. 
McCarthy, John. Remapping Reality: Chaos and Creativity in 
Science and Literature (Goethe – Nietzsche – Grass. 
Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006. 
 33 
                                                                                                                                                              
Murphy, Patrick. Literature, Nature, and Other: Ecofeminist 
Critiques. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1995. 
Nicolis, Grégoire and Ilya Prigogine. Exploring Complexity. New 
York: W.H. Freeman, 1989. 
Phillips, Dana. The Truth of Ecology: Nature, Culture, and 
Literature in America. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003. 
Plumwood, Val. Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of 
Reason. New York: Routledge, 2006. 
Prigogine, Ilya. From Being to Becoming. San Francisco: W.H. 
Freeman & Co, 1980. 
------. The End of Certainty: Time, Chaos, and the New Laws of 
Nature. New York: The Free Press, 1997. 
Prigogine, Ilya and Isabelle Stengers. Order out of Chaos: Man's 
New Dialogue with Nature. Toronto: Bantum, 1984. 
Rigby, Kate. Topographies of the Sacred: The Poetics of Place in 
European Romanticism. Charlottesville: Univ. of Virginia 
Press, 2004. 
Rowland, Herbert, ed. Goethe, Chaos, and Complexity. Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, 2001. 
Schmidt, Jochen. Goethes Faust: Erster und Zweiter Teil. 
Grundlagen—Werk—Wirkung. (Goethe’s Faust: Part I and II. 
Background-Texts-Reception) Munich: Beck, 1999. 
 34 
                                                                                                                                                              
Schneider, Eric D. and Dorion Sagan. Into the Cool: Energy Flow, 
Thermodynamics, and Life. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 
2005. 
Smith, Eric Todd. "Dropping the Subject: Reflections on the 
Motives for an Ecological Criticism." In Reading the Earth: 
New Directions in the Study of Literature and the 
Environment, eds. Michael P. Branch, Rochelle Johnson, 
Daniel Patterson, and Scott Slovic, 29-39. Moscow, ID: 
University of Idaho Press, 1998.  
Stephenson, R.H. "The Diachronic Solidity of Goethe's Faust." In 
A Companion to Goethe's Faust Parts I and II, ed. Paul 
Bishop, 243-270. New York: Camden, 2006. 
Swales, Martin. "The Character and Characterization of Faust." In 
A Companion to Goethe's Faust Parts I and II, ed. Paul 
Bishop, 28-55. New York: Camden, 2006. 
Tantillo, Astrida Orle. "Damned to Heaven: The Tragedy of Faust 
Revisted." Monatshefte 99, no.4 (2007): 454-68. 
Taylor, Peter. "Distributed Agency within Intersecting 
Ecological, Social, and Scientific Processes." In Cycles of 
Contingency: Developmental Systems and Evolution, eds. Susan 
Oyama, Paul E. Griffiths, and Russell D. Gray, 313-332. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001. 
 35 
                                                                                                                                                              
Toffler, Alvin. Foreward to Order out of Chaos: Man's New 
Dialogue with Nature. xi-xxvi. Toronto: Bantum, 1984.  
Ulanowicz, Robert E. Ecology, the Ascendent Perspective. New 
York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1997. 
van der Laan, James. "Faust and Textual Chaos." In Goethe, Chaos 
and Complexity, ed. Herbert Rowland. 105-115. Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, 2001.  
------. "Faust the Technological Mastermind." Bulletin of 
Science, Technology & Society 21, no. 1 (2001): 7-13.  
------. Seeking Meaning for Goethe's Faust. London: Continuum, 
2007. 
von Molnár, Géza. "Hidden in Plan View: Another Look at Goethe's 
Faust." Goethe Yearbook 11 (2002): 33-76.  
 
